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Abstract—In this paper, we implement an anomaly detection 
system using the Dempster-Shafer method. Using two standard 
benchmark problems we show that by combining multiple 
signals it is possible to achieve better results than by using a 
single signal. We further show that by applying this approach 
to a real-world email dataset the algorithm works for email 
worm detection. Dempster-Shafer can be a promising method 
for anomaly detection problems with multiple features (data 
sources), and two or more classes. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) play a pivotal role 
within network security [1]. IDSs are one of many tools used 
to detect attacks and intruders of computer systems. It is 
important to note that the purpose of IDSs is not to prevent 
the entry of intruders to a system, but to notify the 
administrator of any observed intruders. 
IDS techniques can be categorised as either misuse 
detectors or anomaly detectors. Misuse detection systems, 
such as Snort [2], rely on intrusion signatures to detect an 
attack. Such signatures are stored in a database, which relies 
on frequent updates to remain functional. System behaviours 
are matched against the signatures within the database. If a 
successful match is formed, an alert is generated. An 
administrator can use these alerts to investigate the potential 
problem, and generate appropriate responses. However, like 
many anti-virus scanners, misuse-detectors rely on continual 
updates of the signature database. Hence the main drawback 
with this paradigm is that it will never detect ‘day-zero’ 
intrusions to which signatures have not yet been created. 
Conversely, anomaly detection techniques generate 
profiles of normal behaviour. Deviations from the ‘normal 
profile’ result in the generation of alerts, which are used by 
the system administrator for audit purposes. The major 
advantage of anomaly detection systems is that novel attacks 
can be detected. Unfortunately, the profiles are not always 
accurate, as user behaviour changes over time. This can lead 
to the generation of false positive alerts, when previously 
unseen user behaviour occurs for legitimate reasons. The 
false positive rate can be sufficiently high that the anomaly 
detection system can be flooded by these alerts, forcing the 
administrator to either ignore the alerts or disable the system. 
Our work is part of the research to reduce the number of 
false alerts produced by anomaly detection systems.  
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A considerable number of anomaly detection systems have 
been developed. Examples include [3] who employed 
statistical and grammatical metrics to detect anomalies 
within system calls, and [4] which used an immune-inspired 
system to detect abnormal processes.  
Anomaly detection is not restricted to computer security. 
Other applications such as threat assessment and medical 
diagnosis rely on detecting deviations within dynamic 
environments. One technique used for detection is 
Multisensor Data Fusion [5]. This is a form of signal 
processing, where data from multiple sources is used for 
analysis. The Dempster-Shafer theory of inference is a 
statistical method, considered as a generalised Bayesian 
theory, which can be used to combine multiple streams of 
input data. We believe that the Dempster-Shafer method can 
be successfully applied to anomaly detection through 
assigning ‘belief values’ to inputs from various data sources. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section II discusses the fundamentals of the Dempster-Shafer 
Theory and its advantages and disadvantages. An anomaly 
detection approach using the Dempster-Shafer theory is 
presented in III. We give some experimental results for two 
standard benchmark problems in IV and V. These two 
datasets are the Wisconsin Breast Cancer Dataset and the Iris 
dataset of the UCI Machine Learning Repository [6]. The 
experiment results for the email worm dataset (collected by 
our colleague) are described in VI. VII concludes the paper.  
II. THE DEMPSTER-SHAFER (D-S) THEORY 
The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory is a mathematical 
theory of evidence, introduced in the 1960's by Arthur 
Dempster [7] and developed in the 1970's by Glenn Shafer 
[8]. The D-S Theory is viewed as a mechanism for reasoning 
under epistemic (knowledge) uncertainty. The part of the D-
S theory which is of direct relevance to our work is the 
Dempster’s rule of combination. We present some essential 
mathematical terminologies in section A, before we 
introduce the Dempster’s rule of combination in B. We 
introduce the advantages and disadvantages of D-S in C. 
A. Basic mathematical terminology 
Frame of discernment (Θ) is a finite set mutually exclusive 
propositions and hypotheses about some problem domain. 
Basic probability assignment (bpa) is stated in [8] as : “If Θ 
is a frame of discernment, then a function m: [ ]1,02 →Θ  is 
called a basic probability assignment whenever  
0)( =φm                                                    (1)    and 
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The mass value of A (m(A)) is also called A’s basic 
probability number, and it is understood to be the measure of 
the belief that is committed exactly to A.” 
Belief function (Bel) is a belief measure of a proposition A, 
and it sums the mass value of all the non-empty subsets of A. 
This subset is also called the focal element of the Bel. 
∑=
⊆ AB
BmABel )()(                                     (3) 
Plausibility function (Pl) takes into account all the elements 
related to A (either supported by evidence or unknown).  
)(1)( ABelAPl ¬−=                                 (4) 
For the subset A, Bel(A) and Pl(A) represent upper and 
lower belief bounds, and the interval [Bel(A), Pl(A)] 
represents the belief range. The relationships between Bel 
value, Pl value and uncertainty are described in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The uncertainty interval for a hypothesis [9] 
 
B. The Dempster’s Rule of Combination 
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We can use Dempster’s rule of combination to combine 
the mass values of all features from each individual sensor to 
achieve the overall summary mass values for each sensor. 
These summary values from all sensors are combined to give 
the summary mass values for the system. 
Initially, the bpas are used to assign the mass values to 
appropriate hypothesis. Then the resulting mass values are 
used to calculate the belief for the appropriate hypothesis. 
Finally all beliefs are combined with Dempster’s rule of 
combination to gain the overview belief for the appropriate 
hypothesis, as shown in Equation (5). 
C. Advantages and Disadvantages of D-S 
The main advantage of D-S is that no a priori knowledge 
is required, making it potentially suitable for anomaly 
detection of previously unseen information. Another 
advantage is that a value for ignorance can be expressed, 
giving information on the uncertainty of a situation. Bayesian 
inference requires a priori knowledge and does not allow 
allocating probability to ignorance. It can only express the 
probability of an event being either abnormal or normal. It is 
our opinion that a Bayesian approach is not always suitable 
for anomaly detection because pre-existing knowledge may 
not always be provided. In particular, if the aim is to detect 
previously unseen attacks, then a system which relies on 
existing knowledge cannot be used. 
There are two major problems associated with D-S: the 
computation complexity and conflicting beliefs management. 
The computational complexity increases exponentially with 
the number of frames of discernment (Θ). If there are n 
elements in Θ, there will be up to 12 −n  focal elements for the 
mass function. The combination of two mass functions needs 
the computation of up to n2 intersections. To overcome this, 
various algorithms, such as [10] and [11], have been 
suggested to reduce the focal element number in the involved 
mass functions. For anomaly detection, the resulting 
computation complexity is low, as the frame of discernment 
consists of only two elements (normal and abnormal). There 
are up to three focal elements of belief functions: {normal}, 
{abnormal}, and {normal or abnormal} (i.e. the uncertainty), 
resulting in low computation complexity 
The Dempster’s rule of combination redistributes the mass 
values of empty propositions to non-empty propositions, also 
known as normalization step, due to the definition of the 
mass function. This sometimes leads to erroneous results, 
which causes the conflicting management problem. In order 
to solve this problem, some alternative combination rules 
have been proposed, as in [12] and [13], but none have yet 
been accepted as a standard method. In order to illustrate this 
problem, consider the following example: a car window has 
been broken, and the culprit needs to be identified. There are 
three suspicious people (Jon, Mary, and Mike) and two 
witnesses (Witness1 and Witness2). Witness1 assigns “Jon 
broke it” with a mass value of 0.9, and “Mary broke it” with 
a mass value of 0.1; witness2 assigns “Mike broke it” with a 
mass value of 0.9, and “Mary broke it” with a mass value of 
0.1. Both witnesses assign a very small mass value to “Mary 
broke it”. Applying the Dempster’s rule of combination for 
“Mary broke the window”, returns a value of 1, which is not 
accurate. This is because the mass value can be affected by 
taking into account conflicting opinions of multiple sources. 
For our anomaly detection application, each bpa will assign 
a non-zero mass value to {normal or abnormal} as the error 
rate; therefore we will not face any belief conflict problems. 
In summary, the D-S method is a combination of a theory 
of evidence and probable reasoning, to derive a belief that an 
event has occurred. Individual beliefs are updated and 
combined to give a belief of an event occurring in the system 
as a whole. Though a hotly debated point, D-S has 
advantages over Bayesian techniques when applied to 
anomaly detection as described above. For our application, 
each bpa will assign a non-zero mass value to {normal or 
abnormal}, this avoids any belief conflict problems. 
III. THE APPLICATION OF D-S IN ANOMALY DETECTION 
We implemented a D-S system and applied it to two 
standard benchmark problems of the UCI datasets [6], the 
Wisconsin Breast Cancer Dataset (WBCD) and the Iris 
Dataset, and one email dataset made by our colleague. Two 
standard benchmark dataset are chosen to compare our 
approach with the performance of other algorithms, and to 
investigate whether it is possible to achieve good results by 
combining various features using D-S. The email dataset is 
chosen, because it is in our interested application area.  
The anomaly detection system uses a training process to 
0 1 Uncertainty 
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derive thresholds from the training data, and detects an event 
as normal or abnormal (as shown in figure 2). The bpa 
functions are built based on these thresholds for the purpose 
of assigning mass values. The anomaly detection approach is 
demonstrated in figure 3. The data from various sources are 
processed and sent to corresponding bpa assignment 
functions. The mass values for each hypothesis are generated 
and sent to D-S combination component. This component 
uses the Dempster’s rule of combination to combine all mass 
values; and generate the overall mass values for each 
hypothesis. The data can be detected as normal or abnormal 
based on the overall mass values for each hypothesis.  
 
 
Fig. 2.  Data flow of the Anomaly Detection System 
 
All experiments for the three chosen datasets were 
executed on an Intel Pentium 4 CPU, 1.5G Hz, 256MB 
RAM, Windows 2000 platform computer. The system was 
coded using Java 2 platform, Standard Edition (J2SE) 1.4.0. 
The execution times (average running time of 10 runs) for 
the three datasets are: 30 seconds for the WBCD, 25 seconds 
for the Iris dataset, and 12 seconds for the email dataset. 
 
Fig. 3.  Anomaly Detection Approach 
IV. EXPERIMENTS WITH THE WBCD 
A. The Wisconsin breast cancer dataset (WBCD) 
The WBCD is a standard benchmark dataset of the UCI 
Machine Learning Repository [6]. This dataset is chosen for 
two objectives. One is to compare our approach with the 
performance of other algorithms. The other is to investigate 
whether it is possible to achieve good results by combining 
multiple features using D-S, without excessive manual 
intervention or domain knowledge based parameter tuning.  
The WBCD contains 699 data items: 241 malignant items 
(abnormal data), and 458 benign items (normal data). This 
dataset has nine features; all features are normalised integers 
in the range between 1 and 10. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I 
are used to represent the biological features of A: Clump 
Thickness, B: Uniformity of Cell Size, C: Uniformity of Cell 
Shape, D: Marginal Adhesion, E: Single Epithelial Cell Size, 
F: Bare Nuclei, G: Bland Chromatin, H: Normal Nucleoli, 
and I: Mitoses, respectively. There are 16 instances; each 
contains a single missing (i.e. unavailable) attribute value. 
Our D-S based anomaly detection system has the ability to 
cope with this problem by omitting, i.e. not combining, the 
missing values of the corresponding data items. This is an 
advantage of D-S over other approaches, such as [14] [15], 
which have to exclude the 16 items with missing values. 
For the WBCD, the frame of discernment of the system is 
{normal, abnormal}. The bpa function and the threshold 
settings are illustrated in the next section. 
B. The classification approach 
We use ten fold cross validation in our experiment. The 
dataset is divided into ten subsets of approximately equal 
size (one subset size is either 69 or 70). Each time we use the 
data of one subset as test data, and the data of the other nine 
subsets as training data. The training data is used to obtain 
the modified median threshold to build the bpa functions. 
The dataset size is 699, so the training data size is either 630 
or 629. The proportional distribution of the WBCD is 
65.5%:34.5% (normal: abnormal). We order the training data 
feature values from small to large based on each feature. If 
the training data size is 630, the 413
th
 small value of one 
feature is chosen as the modified median threshold. If the 
training data size is 629, the 412
th
 small value of one feature 
is chosen as the modified median threshold.  We use a 
general assumption that the lower value items tend to be 
normal data. 
 
Then the bpa function for each feature is : 
)(1)(
)1( 1
normalmabnormalm
em(normal) threshold)( value
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+= −−
             (6).   
 
Figure 4 shows a graphical illustration of the shapes of 
functions using a sample threshold of 5. Note that for the 
problems we study, all data items are integers and hence the 
functions consist of discrete values only.      
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Fig. 4.  Part of the bpa function for the WBCD, the x-axis shows feature 
values, y-axis shows mass values 
 
All thresholds for nine features are found, and the bpa 
functions are built for each feature. For each data item, the 
bpa functions are used to assign the mass values for each 
feature based on that feature value. For that data item, all 
mass values are combined to obtain the overall mass values 
of the hypothesis normal and of the hypothesis abnormal. If 
the mass value of the ‘abnormal’ hypothesis is bigger than 
the mass value of the ‘normal’ hypothesis, then it is classified 
as abnormal; otherwise it is classified as normal. 
C. Experimental results for the WBCD 
To judge the quality of results, we compare the 
data from various 
sources/features 
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classification accuracies, based on the following definition: 
classification accuracy =
items ofnumber  Total
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Fig. 5. Classification accuracies with various features for the WBCD 
 
Figure 5 shows that feature A (classification rate 86.0%), 
D (85.7%) and I (79.3%) give the poorest performance when 
using only one feature at a time. The result when combing 
multiple features (A, D and I) together (90.0%) is better than 
using either A, D or I alone. Features B (92.7%), C (92.1%), 
and F (91.3%) are the best three features when using only 
one feature at a time. Similarly the result of combining these 
three (95.7%) is better than using either of them alone. The 
result of using all nine features (97.6%) is better than any 
other combination of features. 
Our first hypothesis that combining features using D-S 
improves accuracy is proven correct for the WBCD 
Moreover, our second assumption is also proven correct, i.e. 
a few badly chosen features do not negatively influence the 
results, as long as most chosen features are suitable. These 
two characteristics make D-S very amenable for solving real-
world IDS problems. 
D. Comparison with other methods 
To appreciate the high quality of our results, we provide a 
comparison with other published results. [14] used a 
generalized rank nearest neighbour rule and achieved a 
classification rate of 96.17%; also [15] used a fuzzy 
classification method, with a best result of a classification 
rate equal to 96.7%. Both methods ignore the 16 WBCD 
data items with missing feature values. Our classification rate 
compares favourably with these being 97.6% (including all 
data with missing feature values). The ability to deal with 
missing values is important for network security problems. 
Our method has the advantage of having such ability. 
V. EXPERIMENTS WITH THE IRIS PLANT DATASET 
A. The Iris plant dataset 
The Iris plant dataset is another standard benchmark 
problem of the UCI datasets [6]. This dataset is chosen 
because it has fewer features and more classes than the 
WBCD. This will confirm whether D-S can work on 
problems with fewer features and more classes. 
This dataset has 150 instances with the following four 
numeric features: sepal length in cm; sepal width in cm; petal 
length in cm; and petal width in cm. The dataset also 
contains one predictable feature, namely the class label. 
These 150 instances are of three classes (plant type), Iris 
Setosa, Iris Versicolour, and Iris Virginica, with each class 
containing 50 instances. 
B. The classification approach 
The Iris instances distribution overlapping information, 
based on individual feature, is used to roughly classify the 
Iris data (as shown in Figure 6). A number of items are not 
classified into a single class, such as either Setosa or 
Versicolour. For such data items, we use the difference 
between a data item value and the mean value of the selected 
suitable feature to provide classification into individual 
single classes. This classification approach is achieved in 
three steps, as described below. 
In the first step, the system use bpa A to assign mass 
values to all the four features of one data item based on the 
boundary information. For this data item, the system 
combines the mass values using the Dempster’s rule of 
combination, and then generates the overall mass values and 
belief values for all possible. There are seven possible 
hypotheses for the Iris dataset: {Setosa}; {Versicolour}; 
{Virginica}; {Setosa, Versicolour}; {Setosa, Virginica}; 
{Versicolour, Virginica}; and {Setosa, Versicolour, 
Virginica}. The data item is classified to the hypothesis with 
the highest belief value. If with the results of first step, the 
data item is not classified to a single class, such as {Setosa, 
Versicolour}, then the system uses the second step to classify 
it to a single class. In the second step, initially the most 
suitable feature is selected. Following this, the system uses 
the bpa B to assign mass values based on the distance to the 
mean values of the three classes of that feature. In the third 
step, the system combines the mass values of step one and 
step two. The overall mass values and the belief values are 
calculated.  The items are classified to the hypothesis with 
the highest belief values. 
We use ten fold cross validation in our experiment. The 
dataset is divided into ten subsets of equal size, with nine out 
of ten subsets comprising training data, with the remaining 
subset used as test data. The training data is used to obtain 
the thresholds to build the bpa assignment functions.  
The following parts of section V are organised as below. 
Section B.1 details how to use bpa A to assign mass values 
based on the boundary information. In section B.3, we 
demonstrate the use of bpa B assigning mass values based on 
the differences between a feature value and the mean feature 
values of three classes. Finally the selection of suitable 
features is described in section B.2. 
 
B.1 bpa (basic probability assignment) function A 
Firstly, we need to find the maximum and minimum values 
for each class based on one feature of the training data. Then 
we calculate the overlapping part for the three classes, to 
obtain the boundary information for each class, based on this 
feature of the training data, as shown in Figure 6. For Figure 
6 and 7, each of the vertical lines is the value range for one 
class of one feature; the horizontal lines are used for 
  
 
comparison to calculate the overlap.  
 
class1, class2, class3∈{{Setosa}, {Versicolour}, {Viginica}}. 
 
Fig. 6. Example: for one feature, how to calculate the three class overlap  
 
We use the example of Figure 6 to illustrate how to 
calculate the overlap. If the value is less than min(class2), 
and greater than or equal to min(class1), the data item must 
belong to class1. This is because all the values of the data 
items belonging to class 2 should not be less than 
min(class2). Similarly, the values of the data items belonging 
to class3 should be not less than min(class3). In this case, the 
min(class3) is bigger than min(class2), so the values of the 
data items belong to class 2 or class 3 should not be less than 
min(class2). For the same reason, data items with values 
greater than max(class2), belong to class3. Data items with 
values between min(class2) and min(class3) belong to class 1 
or class 2.  Data items with value between min(class3) and 
max(class1) belong to class 1 or class 2 or class 3. For data 
items containing value between max(class1) and max(class2) 
belong to class 2 or class 3. 
 
Fig. 7.  Example of minimum, maximum value settings for Fig. 6. 
 
In Figure 7, we set example maximum and minimum 
values, to illustrate the assignment of the mass values based 
on the boundary information. For one feature, if the feature 
value is less than min(class1)=1, then that data item is 
classified as class1. We assign m(class1)=0.9, and 
0.1)m( =Θ  based on that feature alone. As nothing is 
hundred percent accurate, we think the trustiness of this 
measurement is 0.9, and set the uncertainty ( )m(Θ ) as 0.1.  
 
For each feature, we have the bpa function A:  
0.1;)m( 0.9,m(class1) ),5.2,( =Θ=−∞∈valueif
0.1;)m( 0.9,class2)  (class1m ),3,5.2[ =Θ=∪∈valueif  
1;)m( ],4,3[ =Θ∈valueif  
0.1;)m( 0.9,class3) (class2m ],5.4,4( =Θ=∪∈valueif  
0.1)m( 0.9,m(class3) ),,5.4( =Θ=+∞∈valueif . 
 
In the first step, we apply bpa function A to each feature 
of one data item, and use the Dempster’s rule of combination 
to combine the mass values of the four features. This 
generates the overall mass values for that data item. The 
overall classification is decided based on the overall mass 
values. If the data item is not classified to a single class, then 
we will use the second step.  
 
B.2 Feature selection 
Suitable features must be selected in order to separate two 
or three classes using the difference between the data item 
value and the mean value of the three classes. A feature is 
required with the following characteristics: the data feature 
values of one single class are close together; and the values 
of two classes viewed as a group are far apart. This is 
achieved by calculating the standard deviation for the two 
classes, and the standard deviation for the union of these two 
classes. This is defined as the Feature Selection Value (FSV), 
shown in Equation 7. The feature with the smallest FSV is 
chosen as the suitable feature.  
The Feature Selection Value (FSV) for n (a natural 
number) classes is: 
)(
)()()(
21
21
n
n
classclassclasssd
classsdclasssdclasssd
FSV
∪⋅⋅⋅∪∪
×⋅⋅⋅××
=       (7) 
For example, to separate the class Setosa and the class 
Versicolour, we select the feature with the smallest 
FSV=
r)Versicolousd(Setosa
lour)sd(VersicoSetosa)(
∪
×sd
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B.3 bpa (basic probability assignment) function B 
In the second step, a suitable feature is selected and the 
bpa function B is used to assign mass values. We build bpa 
function B based on the information of the absolute distances 
(defined as difference in Equation 8) between the data item 
value of the chosen feature and the mean feature value of 
each class. Here, we want to classify the data item as the 
class with the smallest difference.  
 class one of meanvaluedifference −=            (8). 
The information of bpa B is viewed as less important than 
the information of bpa A. The mass value of one affected 
hypothesis is set as 0.8, the uncertainty as 0.2.  
 
We have the following bpa function B: 
if Setosa has the smallest difference, then set   
m(Setosa)=0.8, 0.2)m( =Θ ; 
if Versicolour has the smallest difference, then set 
m(Versicolour)=0.8, 0.2)m( =Θ ; 
if Virginica has the smallest difference, then set 
m(Virginica)=0.8, 0.2)m( =Θ . 
C. Experimental results with the Iris Plant dataset 
The classification accuracy with the Iris plant dataset is 
95.47%± 0.48% (of ten runs). Table 1 shows three out of 
ten of the experimental results (chosen randomly for 
illustrative purpose). These results are based on the whole 
application approach with detailed error information and 
results. The table label meanings are explained below. 
 
• ‘Id’: one item’s identification number. 1-50: ids of Setosa, 
51-100: ids of Versicolour, 101-150: ids of Virginica. 
• ‘Correct(1st)’: the number of correctly classified items 
using the 1
st
 step with the boundary information.  
min(class1)  
  class3 
class1 
  class2 or class3 
 class1 or class2 
  class1 or class2 or class3 
min(class2) 
min(class3) 
max(class2) 
max(class1) 
max(class3) class1≠ class2≠class3 
minclass1= 1 
minclass2=2.5 
minclass3=3 
maxclass2=4.5 
maxclass1=4 
maxclass3=5.5 class1≠ class2≠class3 
  
 
• ‘Errors(1st)’: the number of errors caused by the first step 
which only use the boundary information. 
• ‘In two(1st)’: the number of date items, whose results are 
not in a single class after the first step.  
• ‘Errors(2nd)’: the errors caused by the second step which 
use the “difference” information 
 
TABLE 1 THE IRIS PLAN EXPERIMENTS USING THE WHOLE APPROACH 
1st Run of the experiments—classification accuracy=96.6667 
Id Correct(1st) Errors(1st) In two(1st) Errors(2nd) 
1-50 50 0 0 0 
51-100 35 2 (Id= 71,86) 13 Id=78 
101-150 42 2(Id=107,120) 6 0 
2nd Run of the experiments—classification accuracy=95.3333% 
Id Correct(1st) Errors(1st) In two(1st) Errors(2nd) 
1-50 50 0 0 0 
51-100 33 4(Id=51,71,84, 86) 13 Id=78 
101-150 42 2(Id=107,120) 6 0 
3rd Run of the experiments—classification accuracy=94.6667% 
Id Correct(1st) Errors(1st) In two(1st) Errors(2nd) 
1-50 50 0 0 0 
51-100 34 5(Id=51,57,71,84,86) 11 Id=78 
101-150 43 2(Id=107,120) 5 0 
 
The data items 71, 86, 107 and 120 are wrongly classified 
in all these three runs, due to the first step of the 
classification approach. The 78 is wrongly classified in all 
three runs, due to the second step of the classification.  
In Table 2, the parameters used in the 2
nd
 run of the 
experiments for data 86 are shown. We use this example to 
show how some mistakes may occur. 86: F1-6 (classified as 
class23); F2-3.4(class13); F3-4.5(class23); and F4-1.6 (class23). 
It is classified as class 3 using the 1
st
 step, which is wrong. 
F1, F3, and F4 express belief of class23, and F2 expresses 
belief of class13. The combination result is class3. One 
plausible reason is that the training data does not include all 
the information of the test data; perhaps the parameters are 
not totally accurate. For the same reason, the data item 78 is 
wrongly classified due to the 2
nd
 step. This can be improved 
by combining 1
st
 and 2
nd
 steps together. If we use 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
step together for all the data, the expected results can be 
improved. We can also use a finer grained model to extract 
these individual features of the Iris data, which can also lead 
to better performance. 
 
TABLE 2 THE PARAMETERS OF THE TRAINING SET FOR THE DATA ITEM 86 
  Class1 Class2 Class3 
max 5.8 6.9 7.9 Feature1 
(F1) min 4.3 4.9 4.9 
max 4.4 3.3 3.8 Feature2 
(F2) min 2.3 2.0 2.2 
max 1.9 5.1 6.7 Feature3 
(F3) min 1.0 3.3 4.5 
max 0.6 1.7 2.5 Feature4 
(F4) min 0.1 1 1.4 
D. Comparison with other methods 
The classification accuracy of our method applied to the 
Iris data is 95.47%± 0.48% over 10 runs. It is similar as 
published results of other established methods (whose results 
are between 94.67% and 97.33%) [16]. This demonstrates 
the ability of D-S to successfully classify items within 
datasets comprising few features and multiple classes. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS WITH EMAIL DATASETS 
We have confirmed the potential of D-S to produce robust, 
high quality results. Then we turn our attention to the 
problem of worm detection. Due to the lack of datasets, we 
have derived our own data suitable for the detection of email 
worms. Worm detection forms a large subset of computer 
security and provides us with a managed problem to solve. 
A. The email dataset 
Email dataset was created by combining a week's worth of 
emails (90 emails) from a user's sent box with outgoing 
emails (42 emails) sent by a computer infected with the 
netsky-d worm. The aim of this experiment is to correctly 
detect the 42 worm infected emails. With expert experience, 
we decide to use these attributes of each individual email: its 
sender is spoofed or not; whether it contains dangerous 
attachments, whether it contains non-dangerous attachments, 
the time interval since last email was sent. This information 
is listed in Table 3. Spoofed sender can be defined as a 
sender with a fake email address; pif: program information 
file, i.e. a dangerous file type; doc: word file (Considered as 
non-dangerous here). 
 
TABLE 3  SUMMARY OF THE EMAIL DATASET 
Message Spoofed Sender number & type of attachments 
39-59 (worm) Yes 1 pif 
61-81 (worm) Yes 1 pif 
12, 101 No 1 doc 
Others No 0 
B. The worm detection process 
The four features used here are: signal1 – the time interval 
from last message sent, signal2 – the sender (spoofed-1, 
normal-0), signal3 – whether there are any dangerous 
attachment files (0 – no, 1 – yes), signal4 – whether there are 
some non-dangerous attachment files (0 - no, 1 - yes). 
Signal1 has a big range and varies from 0 to 94665, its bpa 
function is presented in Figure 8, the bpa functions used by 
the other three features are described in Table5. 
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Fig. 8.  bpa for signal1, the x-axis shows seconds since last email 
 
With experience, the signals can be ranked in order of 
importance (high to low): signal2, signal3, signal1 and 
signal4. Threshold settings were decided following this order 
(shown in Table 4). From this information, mass value 
settings were derived, as shown in Table 5. 
 
TABLE 4 THRESHOLD SETTINGS FOR EMAIL DATASET  
Features threshold Min m(normal) Max m(normal) 
Signal 1 30 0.3 0.7 
Signal 2 1 0.1 0.9 
Signal 3 1 0.2 0.8 
Signal 4 1 0.4 0.6 
  
 
TABLE 5 MASS VALUE SETTINGS FOR EMAIL DATASET ( M(Θ )=0.01) 
 value m(normal) m(abnormal) 
Signal 1 =value 3.0)1(4.0 130 ++ −− )( valuee  1-m(normal)- )(Θm  
=0 0.9 0.09 
Signal 2 
=1 0.1 0.89 
=0 0.8 0.19 
Signal 3 
=1 0.2 0.79 
=0 0.6 0.39 
Signal 4 
=1 0.4 0.59 
 
We assign the mass values for each individual feature of 
one email using the settings in Table 5. These mass values 
for the same email are combined using the combination rule 
based on each individual hypothesis. The overall mass values 
of each hypothesis are generated. That email is classified as 
the hypothesis with the higher overall mass value. 
C. Experimental Results with email dataset 
When using four signals, all 42 worm infected emails were 
detected correctly, as shown in Figure 9. As it is not always 
easy to determine a spoofed sender, we re-run the 
experiments removing this signal (Figure 10). Messages 39 
and 61 were undetected when using the three remaining 
features (i.e. signal1, signal3, and signal4). The wrongly 
classified messages are those messages sent directly after 
legitimate traffic. Hence, the time intervals since last 
message sent of the two messages appear normal, with the 
only abnormal features being the executable attachment. 
Because all the three features have similar weights, and two 
of them indicate that the emails are normal, they are wrongly 
classified as normal. This can be corrected by weighting 
these features with greater different mass values, or adding in 
more effective features. A more effective feature can be the 
number of words contained in an email. We will look into 
these issues in future experiments. 
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Fig. 9.  Results of email data using all four features 
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Fig. 10.  Results of email data using signal1, signal3, signal4 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The experimental results for the WBCD (with nine 
features and two classes) show that we successfully classify a 
standard dataset by combing multiple features using the D-S 
method. The results for the Iris dataset (with four features, 
three classes) show that we can also use D-S for problems 
with more than two classes, with fewer features. Our system 
successfully detects email worms through experiments with a 
realistic email dataset. These results indicate that D-S 
method works successfully for anomaly detection by 
combing the beliefs from multiple sources. Based on these 
results, we can conclude that D-S can be a promising method 
for network security problems with multiple features (from 
various data sources) and two or more classes. 
Of course, like other classification algorithms, the initial 
feature selection influences overall performance. However, 
due to the inherent robustness of D-S, as long as there the 
majority features are suitable, our system still works, even if 
some features are poor. Furthermore, our approach works in 
situations where some feature values are missing, which is 
likely to occur in real world network security scenarios. Our 
continuing aim is to find out how D-S based algorithms can 
be used more effectively for the purpose of anomaly 
detection within the domain of network security. 
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